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Post by Yahweh on Jun 12, 2009 23:16:28 GMT -5
Human life is a resource. It is precious because it is fragile and useful. Sure you can replace it, but that takes time. You shouldn't kill people unless absolutely necessary simply because that would be a squandering of resources. Interesting way to put it, but humans aren't exactly scarce resources, nor are they particularly irreplaceable.
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Post by Undecided on Jun 13, 2009 0:34:15 GMT -5
I'll try this one. When you sort out your morality, are you letting your feelings guide what your ethical code should be? Or are you telling yourself how you're supposed to feel, morally speaking, in any particular situation? In other words, which of the following statements is more descriptive of morality: `My code of ethics exists so I can avoid feeling morally repugnant.' OR `My feelings of morality are determined by a moral code.' ? The former statement implies that you believe that morality is subjective, because emotional experience is inherently subjective. The latter statement implies that you believe that morality is objective, because moral codes are (presumably) independent entities to which multiple people can attest simultaneously. Or you can take the approach the intersubjective approach: morality does not exists outside of subjective wants, but its not created by it either. Morality exists in the space filled by intersubjective constructs, meaning it exists between people and their interactions. It exists in fundamentally the same way that friendships and economies exist. (Actually I'd argue that morality exists in a way similar to an economy than a friendship. Economies are emergent phenomena which occur when people compete and trade scarce resources. Friendships exist when people agree they exist.) I'd go even further to state that its not important to demonstrate that morality is "correct" in any scientifically quantifiable way. What matters is moral consistency -- if we can reduce morality down to a set of moral principles, even subjective principles, we can test those principles for moral consistency. If its possible to show that a moral system is internally inconsistent, we can reject it outright. In general, this allows for two mutually exclusive, yet internally consistent moral principles to exist simultaneously -- I don't believe this is a problem, I liken it to the way that Turing Machines and Lamda Calculus define two very different formal systems for describing computations, yet both systems are capable of describing the exact same set computations. In my experience, internally consistent moral systems, whatever they may be, almost always prescribe the same set of behaviors, and are indistinguishable from one another in practice. Any approach toward an internally consistent ethic is an approach toward a "correct" one. We can appreciate a consistent ethic on its own merits without ever committing ourselves to the position that morality is objective or subjective. Gödel's incompleteness theoremsDeontic LogicI can't believe I'm citing these exotic concepts, but logic and CS form a useful analogy for the situation at hand. If any person's moral code could be refined into a formal axiomatic Deontic logic, and their sense of morality into a Turing-esque proof machine, then Gödel's theorem would apply by analogy: any such sufficiently complex logic with the tools to prove its own consistency would be inconsistent, and so heuristically we are left unable to tell if our own moral codes are consistent or complete. Also by analogy, the ability to deem another person's moral code as consistent depends on our moral code being more complex than theirs: we can only ever have relative consistency: person A's moral code is consistent if person B's is. This also introduces another question: what about a person with absolutely no moral code, e.g., a newborn child? Their morality would be vacuously consistent.
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Post by Yahweh on Jun 13, 2009 10:09:12 GMT -5
Gödel's incompleteness theoremsDeontic LogicI can't believe I'm citing these exotic concepts, but logic and CS form a useful analogy for the situation at hand. If any person's moral code could be refined into a formal axiomatic Deontic logic, and their sense of morality into a Turing-esque proof machine, then Gödel's theorem would apply by analogy: any such sufficiently complex logic with the tools to prove its own consistency would be inconsistent, and so heuristically we are left unable to tell if our own moral codes are consistent or complete. The Incompleteness Theorem states that its possible to construct statements within a well-defined formal system whose truth cannot be derived from the axioms of the formal system. For example, there's no way to determine whether there are infinite cardinalities between { cardinality of all natural numbers } and { cardinality of all real numbers } from the axioms of arithematic. Similarly, we can asking meaninful questions which fit into the logical framework of science, but cannot be determined to be true or false from the axioms of science -- this has the unsettling conclusions that absolute knowledge is impossible, even if there are a finite number of facts in the universe and we had access to all of them. The trick with Godel is keeping in mind that his theorem does NOT state that all statements in a formal system are unknowable and unprovable. It simply states that no formal system beyond the most trivial ones can be complete and consistent. What implications do you think incompleteness theorem has on moral systems? So is an infant's formal system of mathematics. What are you getting at?
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Post by John E on Jun 13, 2009 18:49:44 GMT -5
The entire concept of "value" is inherently subjective. Inherently subjective? Can you support that with an argument of some kind? Can you objectively prove that something has moral value?
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Post by Marc on Jun 13, 2009 20:25:25 GMT -5
I'm afraid I just don't see why being human matters all. Species membership, in and of itself, communicates no facts that anyone can make a moral decision from. What makes " I'm a human, therefore all other humans are equally value valuable" valid, but the equivalent statement " I'm a living being, therefore all other living beings are equally valuable" is false. What objective reason is there for excluding all other forms of life from moral consideration? Mostly it's because I am human, and thus, my morals must come from that fact. As I mentioned earlier, do we criticize carnivores for eating other animals? Of course not, that is how they evolved. Humans are unique in their ability to not only make "moral" decisions, but to express them. As a human, I recognize them. As an atheist, I feel that I need to rationally determine why I hold these views. Because of the fact I am human, these rationalizations will of course be centered on my humanness. Certainly, I feel that torturing animals for the heck of it is wrong. Why? There is no objective reason to do so. However, being an omnivore, I do need animal protein in my diet, so killing animals for their meat is acceptable. Again, would I criticize a lion for eating an antelope? That's just how nature works. Just because I am able to rationalize, doesn't mean I should not eat meat. Again, I am an omnivore. I need animal protein to survive, so there is nothing wrong with killing an animal to provide me with that food. Suffering? No. I'm actually at odds with the livestock industry and the way they provide mass produced meat products. There is no objective reason to make animals suffer so. Yes, we need the protein their meat provides, but there has to be a better way than to make cows stand in their excrement all day or chickens live in tiny cages to produce eggs all day. I wish I could say I only go to people who don't treat their animals that way, but given my location, and my income, unfortunately, it's often the only way I can eat. As for killing animals for food, I will repeat, a human is as entitled to kill an animal for food as a lion is entitled to kill an antelope. We need the protein to survive. Call it the "survival of the fittest," if you like, or "The Great Circle of Life," if that appeals to you more. If nothing else, when I die, I will be worm food, and then other animals can take their revenge on me. Marc
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Post by Marc on Jun 13, 2009 20:31:31 GMT -5
Inherently subjective? Can you support that with an argument of some kind? Can you objectively prove that something has moral value? If only because I can't prove objectively that humans don't have intrinsic (I'm assuming that's what you meant, based on the conversation. If I'm wrong, please correct me.) value. Think about it. Is there any objective reason to assert that another human being has any more or less intrinsic value than you? You are a human, they are a human. Sure, you may be better (or less) educated, but that doesn't make you more or less human. You may be stronger, taller, wealthier, more over all able, but you are still a human being, as are they. To the best of my knowledge, there is no objective reason to say a person is more or less human than I am. Thus, all humans must have the same intrinsic value I do. Marc
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Post by John E on Jun 13, 2009 21:24:04 GMT -5
Marc, I agree. You make a good point that there is no objective reason to believe that any human being has more or less moral than any other. On the other hand, is there any objective reason to believe that a human has any intrinsic moral value in the first place? Is there any objective reason to believe that a human being has any more or less intrinsic value than a fish? A tree? A rock? A soiled pair of underwear?
If there is, I'd honestly like to know.
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Post by Undecided on Jun 13, 2009 21:35:08 GMT -5
The trick with Godel is keeping in mind that his theorem does NOT state that all statements in a formal system are unknowable and unprovable. It simply states that no formal system beyond the most trivial ones can be complete and consistent. What implications do you think incompleteness theorem has on moral systems?, Supposing that any moral system might be modelled as a Deontic logic, and we're the computer trying to prove things using the axioms and inference rules of this logic, Godel's 1st incompleteness theorem here could imply that any (nontrivial) consistent moral system must have statements of morality it can't decide or justify. Godel's 2nd incompleteness theorem would then imply that the only ways to determine whether another person's moral system is consistent is to use a moral system which subsumes his or hers, analogous to how in mathematics consistency is relative. I'm saying that internal consistency is nice, but it isn't enough: the presumed formal systems of infants are trivial and consistent, but we wouldn't let an infant make moral decisions for us because they have nothing to base them on. We're looking for the "best" consistent moral system, just how mathematicians of that time searched for the "best" axiomatic basis for mathematics.
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Post by Yahweh on Jun 13, 2009 23:02:28 GMT -5
I'm afraid I just don't see why being human matters all. Species membership, in and of itself, communicates no facts that anyone can make a moral decision from. What makes " I'm a human, therefore all other humans are equally value valuable" valid, but the equivalent statement " I'm a living being, therefore all other living beings are equally valuable" is false. What objective reason is there for excluding all other forms of life from moral consideration? Mostly it's because I am human, and thus, my morals must come from that fact. In case I'm not making myself clear, the argument "I'm a human, so all other humans matter" is a non-sequitor, the conclusion doesn't follow from the premises. What does species membership have to do with moral consideration? What makes this particular group more remarkable than all other groups you belong to, such as your genus and kingdom membership? For that matter, why no make the group more narrow to family membership, race membership, sex membership, etc? A better reason would be that carnivores aren't rational beings who are capable of making moral decisions about their diet, and so aren't the rightful subjects of praise of blame for their behavior. I'm not overly concerned with your behavior, just whether your principles are consistent. It doesn't seem that whatever principles you hold are very consistent at all. For a start, if you believe human infants and the mentally feeble should be protected, then clearly rationality is not a prerequisite to moral consideration -- and in that case, there's no rational basis for excluding non-human animals from moral consideration, at least by the moral principles you've laid out. More than that, you made a comment about suffering, presumably because it has some kind of moral consequence to you. Unlike the capacity to make moral decisions, suffering is not a unique human experience. By your own principles, there's no reason not to take suffering into consideration, and there is no moral difference between purposefully tormenting a human and purposefully tormenting a non-human animal. Your are more than welcome to correct me if I've misunderstood you. Now, with regard to the comment that you need animal protein to survive, that's false. Protein is not any more or less valuable to your body simply because it comes from an animal. To use me as an example, I've been a vegan for more than 5 years and I'm not dead yet -- I'm in perfect health. If you believe that suffering matters, change your behavior and boycott animal slaughter. The key here is moral consistency. Whatever animals do in the wild has nothing to do with your behavior. Lions can't make moral decisions about their diet, you can. More than that, you can minimize the harm that you cause to feeling beings, so you're obliged to do exactly that no matter how other animals behave in the wild.
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Post by Yahweh on Jun 14, 2009 0:23:54 GMT -5
Inherently subjective? Can you support that with an argument of some kind? Can you objectively prove that something has moral value? Morality is almost always concerned with the way people are affected, so its impossible to separate moral judgments from peoples feelings. Its shaped by peoples wants, desires, expectations, and so on. But that's not the same as stating that values are just figments of peoples imaginations. I wrote in this post that the objective/subjective dichotomy oversimplifies the nature of moral values: Moral rules emerge when people in a community interact with one another and intelligently pursue or avoid certain behaviors. Moral theories aim to explain why some behaviors are worth pursing rather than avoiding and vice versa? Subjectivism is one moral theory, just not a useful one. It states that the phrases "X is morally good / X is right / X ought to be done" all mean "I, the speaker, approve of X". So, when George Bush says "Abortion is immoral", he means "I, George Bush, oppose abortion"; when Betty Friedan says "Abortion is moral", she means "I, Betty Friedan, support abortion". The problem with subjectivism is that it doesn't really explain how moral disputes even arise in the first place. According to subjectivism, when George Bush says abortion is wrong, he's stating his attitude with regard to abortion -- Betty Friedan would certainly agree that George Bush disapproves of abortion. Likewise, when Betty Friedan replies "Abortion is a woman's right", subjectivist George Bush will agree that Betty Friedan is stating that she approves of abortion. Although it may sound like an argument between Bush and Friedan, their words are equivalent to shouting back and forth between each other "I like blue!" "Well, I like red!!". Since subjectivism asserts that both individuals are merely stating their attitudes, they have no disagreement with one another to begin with ---- errrr, what? That's not right. These two people certainly do have a disagreement, namely on whether women should be having abortions! Bush and Friedan must have a disagreement on the shared set of principles which exist between them regarding the ethical treatment of humans. Disagreements of this sort are only possible if subjectivism is false, or at least a notoriously inadequate theory for describing how people actually interact with one another.
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Post by John E on Jun 14, 2009 10:13:34 GMT -5
In other words, no, you cannot objectively prove that something has moral value.
EDIT: What I mean is, yeah, you can show how and why moral codes (i.e. tendencies towards certain behaviors which are generally thought of as moral) come into being, but calling these behaviors "good" and others "bad" is entirely subjective.
You can say "X behavior is morally wrong because it harms someone," but you first have to accept that harming someone is morally wrong, which cannot be objectively proven.
You can say "Y behavior is morally wrong because it harms society," but you first have to accept that harming society is morally wrong, which cannot be objectively proven.
You can say "It's okay to kill and eat plants but not animals because animals have more moral value," but you first have to accept that animals have more moral value than plants, which cannot be objectively proven.
You might say, "But animals have the ability to think and feel," but for that argument to be valid, you first have to accept that the ability to think and feel convey moral value, which cannot be objectively proven.
I've read you, Yahweh, say many times that a beings moral value is determined by their ability to think, feel, make moral choices, etc. You use this line of reasoning to push your veganism, being that since a cow has similar mental capacity to a baby, we shouldn't eat cows because it's morally equal to eating babies, or whatever. While I disagree with this argument for other reasons, what matters for our current conversation is that fundamentally, you cannot prove that the ability to think, feel, make moral choices, etc. conveys any moral value in the first place.
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Post by Marc on Jun 14, 2009 11:27:52 GMT -5
Marc, I agree. You make a good point that there is no objective reason to believe that any human being has more or less moral than any other. On the other hand, is there any objective reason to believe that a human has any intrinsic moral value in the first place? Is there any objective reason to believe that a human being has any more or less intrinsic value than a fish? A tree? A rock? A soiled pair of underwear? If there is, I'd honestly like to know. Intrinsically, no? After all, were there no humans, the world would likely continue on just fine. I think that the best I can say is that all species/items have relative value depending on which species is viewing them. Take Yahweh's oak tree, for example. It has value as a home for many organisms, it has value to the soil (sorta) for preventing erosion, it has value to humans as a material. To the planet, it has value in that it takes in carbon dioxide and lets off oxygen. But to say it has more or less value than a human, however, no, I can't find an objective reason to say so. Marc
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Post by Yahweh on Jun 14, 2009 13:27:59 GMT -5
I agree. Haven't you noticed how I approach people in moral discussions: I always ask people about their own private moral beliefs, then I hold them up to their own standards. I never need to state that any moral principles that I hold or anyone else holds are objective facts. The only difference between me and other people is that I don't hold the view that there is any useful distinction between subjectivist and objectivist approaches to morality. In fact, the fascination people have with connecting moral statements to statements of fact is overrated. There is a fascinating article which describes this point of view in detail. Its a long article, so here's the tl;dr version: There are usually two points of when it comes to morality: 1) Subjectivism, which states that any principle can be held as a moral principle regardless of its content, and that people's behaviors are determined by whatever moral principles they hold. There is no step in between hold a moral principle and acting on it, people always act in ways consistent with their moral principles. The downside is that, according to subjectivism, there's no relationship between statements of fact and moral conclusions, so that a person can genuinely accept that torturing another will cause them to suffer, but will not conclude that any moral prescriptions follow from that fact. Its only possible to persuade a subjectivist not to torture others by showing that "not torturing others" is in tune with whatever principles they already hold. 2) Descriptivism (I prefer this term over the misleading "objectivism") is the opposite of subjectivism. It states that there are limits on the form and content of principles which may be held as a moral principle, of which there are many kinds of morality which describe the form and content rules that all principles must satisfy. An example rule might be "a principle is only valid if it can be universalized". Descriptivism is nice because it ties statements of fact directly to moral statements, so that if someone accept the principle that suffering is bad, then they cannot resist an argument that people ought not to cause others to suffer needlessly. Unfortunately, there's nothing in principle which stops a descriptivist from accepting a moral principle, but then saying "I'm just not interested in being moral". So, subjectivism ties morality to behavior, but not statements of fact, we have a fact-action divide; descriptivism ties morality to reason, but cannot tie morality back to behavior, we have a reason-action divide. It seems like we have two totally incompatible philosophies with completely different views on how moral conclusions relate to statements of fact, but neither of which bridges the gap between facts, reasons, and action. This is the whole reason why we have an is-ought dilemma in the first place, its identical to the argument Hume laid out in his Treatise on Human Nature. There is a wide-spread misconception that the is-ought debate is concerned with connecting statements of fact to moral judgments. While that is certainly one prong the debate, the real argument is how we connect statements of fact to reasons for acting. Interestingly, reasons for acting (not necessarily moral reasons) between subjectivists and descriptivists do not differ at all. While a descriptivist can accept the truth of any number of moral claims, they can simply refuse to heed any moral rules. We might persuade a descriptivist to act in certain ways by appeal to his or her feelings. For example, we can get them to give to charity because of the personal fulfillment they will feel for having done so; we might say that a descriptivist should not live an entirely self-fulling, hedonistic on the basis that the paradox of hedonism will ultimately doom them to an unsatisfying, disappointing life; we might be able to persuade a descriptivist to follow the rule of law for the sake of avoiding backlash. We can say a lot of things to descriptivist to persuade them to behave in some way that descriptivist will agree is morally good -- whether these are valid reasons or not is not my point. The real issue here is that we could use the exact same reasons to persuade a subjectivist to change their behavior as well. The distinction between both point of view is whether they define morality closer to the "fact" side of the dilemma or the "reason" side, but neither point of view affects the arguments people relating to action. In other words, the distinction between subjectivist and descriptivist points of view is strictly terminological. Since the reasons for acting for subjectivists and descriptivists are substantially the same, neither moral framework has any practical limitation on how we move from facts to action.
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Post by John E on Jun 14, 2009 14:09:05 GMT -5
You seem to be misunderstanding me. I'm not arguing that any and all moral codes are equal, and that they don't even have to be internally consistent (which is what you seems to think I mean by "subjective"). What I'm saying is that all moral codes have to start with some basic, fundamental principles on which specific moral decisions and codes of conduct are based, and that those basic, fundamental principles (for example, that the ability to think and feel conveys moral value) cannot be objectively proven or disproven and are therefor subjective.
In other words, morality is dependent on something that is a dirty word among atheists and agnostics: faith.
As a result, while I generally agree with you that moral codes that are consistent and based on objective facts are preferable to those that are inconsistent and arbitrary, I often read you saying that this, that or the other principle (such as species relation or potentiality) are not valid principles for a moral code, even though they can be applied consistently and are based on objective fact.
I am also saying that value is not intrinsic, that the same thing can have different value to different people. For example, what is the value of a Britney Spears CD? $12, right? That's what Best Buy charges for it. In reality though, its value is less than $12 to some people, so they don't buy it because it's not a good trade for them, but its value is more than $12 for other people, who do buy it, because for them it's a good trade.
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Post by Marc on Jun 16, 2009 21:33:15 GMT -5
Yahweh, sorry to take so long to get back to you. I got distracted the other day, and am just getting back to posting. Mostly it's because I am human, and thus, my morals must come from that fact. In case I'm not making myself clear, the argument "I'm a human, so all other humans matter" is a non-sequitor, the conclusion doesn't follow from the premises. What does species membership have to do with moral consideration? What makes this particular group more remarkable than all other groups you belong to, such as your genus and kingdom membership? For that matter, why no make the group more narrow to family membership, race membership, sex membership, etc? Sex, race and family are too narrow a field for objective judgment. While I am different from non-white females who aren't members of my family, we're all still human. I start at species because it's easiest. Sure, I can broaden it to all primates, or all mammals, or, ultimately to all living things, but for the most part, the majority of my interactions take place with other humans. Thus, I use it as a starting point, and work my way from there. I seem to recall reading somewhere that carnivores are also unable to survive on a vegetarian diet. I don't recall where, and won't claim it as fact. Here's my question though: If you say it is wrong to kill animals, then surely you would be for preventing others from killing them. If you saw someone about to kill someone else, and could prevent it, I'm sure you would. Shouldn't this then extend to animals? Especially since they can't make moral decisions? Why stop at animal, then? If I believe that non-human animals should be protected, shouldn't I then argue that all life forms should be protected? There is no objective reason for drawing the line at animals, anymore than there is a just humans. Like I said earlier, human is a starting point. I've re-read my comments, and the only thing about suffering was in response to something you had said. You brought up suffering, not me. So let me give you this scenario: If killing an animal for food could be done in such a way that the animal didn't suffer (say, rendering it unconscious first), would that be acceptable to you? I haven't read too much on vegan diet, so I won't claim to be an authority, and feel free to correct me on whatever mistakes I make: 1) Eating a vegan lifestyle requires a great deal of planning and careful monitoring. Also, it's if not cost-prohibitive, than rather expensive. 2) Children are not able to eat a vegan lifestyle. I'm not certain if either of those two are true. If they are, they would certainly give me pause for following a vegan lifestyle. Again, if killing an animal for food can be done in such a way as to cause no suffering, would it be wrong? I don't argue that that is what is being done now, as I know it's not. What I am trying to do is show you that it's pointless to end at animals if you're going to argue moral consistency. If it's wrong to kill an animal, then it's wrong to kill a plant. If that's true, then the entire human race would starve to death in a matter of days. Whatever animals do in the wild has nothing to do with your behavior. Lions can't make moral decisions about their diet, you can. More than that, you can minimize the harm that you cause to feeling beings, so you're obliged to do exactly that no matter how other animals behave in the wild.[/quote] Neither can small children. Does this mean we shouldn't correct them when they do something wrong? By your arguments, we should be policing the lions and wolves, to ensure they don't eat meat. Marc
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